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Abolishing the Audit Commission:
Framing, Discourse Coalitions and
Administrative Reform
KATHERINE TONKISS* & CHRIS SKELCHER**
*School of Languages and Social Sciences, Aston University, Birmingham, UK, **Institute of Local
Government Studies, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
ABSTRACT The abolition of the Audit Commission in England raises questions about
how a major reform was achieved with so little controversy, why the agency lacked the
institutional stickiness commonly described in the literature on organisational reform and
why it did not strategise to survive. In this paper, we apply argumentative discourse
analysis to rich empirical data to reveal the pattern and evolution of storylines and
discourse coalitions, and the ways in which these interact with and affect the practices
of Parliament, the media and the Audit Commission itself. Our analysis shows that the
politics of administrative reform are as much about discursive framing and the ability of
pro-reformers to gain discursive structuration and institutionalisation as they are about
the material resources available to a newly elected government and its ministers.
Questions of technical feasibility are unlikely to derail a reform initiative once its
promoters gain discursive ascendency.
KEY WORDS: Audit Commission, reform, discourse coalition, institutional stickiness,
local government
Introduction
The Audit Commission for Local Authorities and the National Health Service
(NHS) in England, a UK government agency operating at arm’s length to minis-
ters, has played a key role in the audit, inspection, performance improvement and
regulation of local authorities and other local public service providers in England
since its creation in 1983. It developed a signiﬁcant role in supporting the local
government efﬁciency agendas of Conservative governments from 1983 to 1997
and was central to the 1997–2010 Labour governments’ ambition to improve the
performance of local public services. Following the May 2010 general election,
however, the incoming Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government
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moved quickly to reduce the Audit Commission’s budget, terminate some of its
functions and require all its local audit work to be outsourced. Shortly thereafter it
stated its intention to legislate to abolish the Commission and introduce a new
locally managed system for auditing local authorities. The announcement of the
proposed abolition emerged without prior consultation with the agency itself, or
with stakeholders in the wider local government public service community. The
proposal was justiﬁed by a narrative of improved accountability and efﬁciency,
reﬂecting a combination of the ‘localism’ and ‘austerity’ agendas being pursued by
this new government. Somewhat surprisingly for such a major and unexpected
organisational change the announcement was not regarded as contentious. Debate
during the consultation and legislative phases of the policy process focused largely
on the feasibility of the new local audit system, rather than the end of the Audit
Commission.
The literature on changes to the machinery of government typically empha-
sises the complexity and contestation that surrounds such proposals in the face of
the tendency to path dependency (Dommett and Skelcher 2014; March and Olsen
1983; Yesilkagit and Christensen 2010). Further, the Audit Commission’s func-
tions were deeply embedded in the structure and psyche of central–local govern-
ment relations, as well as through its wider role in relation to NHS bodies, police
and ﬁre authorities, social housing providers and a number of other local public
service organisations. Thus it might be expected to exhibit ‘institutional sticki-
ness’ (Pierson 2002). On the other hand, observers who are familiar with the
history of the Audit Commission may point to the growing antipathy by local
government and other stakeholders towards its ever-evolving data collection and
inspection regimes, combined with a new government that wishes to remove
centralised performance and audit regimes. In addition, we should not ignore the
appointment of a populist, and avowedly anti-centralist, Secretary of State.
The purpose of this paper is therefore to explore why such a major institutional
reformwas able to be enacted in an apparently unproblematic way, and in doing so to
provide insights for the literature on administrative reform.We show how narratives,
stories, metaphors and other linguistic devices are an important medium through
which change is negotiated (Hardy, Palmer, and Phillips 2000; Llewelyn 2001;
Vogel 2012). Speciﬁcally, we employ ‘argumentative discourse analysis’ (ADA;
Hajer 1993, 2005), whose central theoretical proposition is that policy change results
from a process of normative framing expressed as storylines by a coalition of actors
that potentially become hegemonic. This is a somewhat different approach to that
adopted in much of the substantial literature on public sector administrative reform,
where change is explained at the macro-level in terms of ideational, institutional and
ideological factors (e.g. Christensen and Lægreid 2002; Pennings 2010; Pollitt and
Bouckaert 2011; Yesilkagit and de Vries 2004). ADA highlights how narratives can
translate complex ideological concepts into everyday ‘common sense’ and as such
provides this micro-level of analysis (Lau and Schlesinger 2005; Laws and Rein
2003; Moynihan 2006; Smullen 2010a, 2010b; Vogel 2012). It helps to explain
success or failure in the implementation of administrative reform by paving the way
for the deployment of the material resources available to protagonists.
862 K. Tonkiss & C. Skelcher
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 06
:05
 20
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
We gathered documentary data covering the period from mid-2009, when
political party general election manifestos began to be formulated, until early
2014 when the legislation to abolish the Audit Commission received Royal
Assent. Data were gathered from press releases, Hansard (the record of
Parliamentary debates), Parliamentary select committee reports and evidence,
and ministerial and Audit Commission statements. Utilising the LexisNexis
database, we conducted a keyword search of Local Government Chronicle
(LGC), the weekly professional journal for that sector, the Financial Times,
Guardian and Daily Telegraph, to give a cross section of the quality daily
newspapers; and the Daily Mail, which had run a large number of sensational
articles about the Audit Commission. This produced 66 articles relevant to our
study.
We supplemented these data with in-depth, semi-structured and transcribed
interviews with ﬁve Audit Commission board members or senior ofﬁcials. We
also gathered data from a current Coalition minister, and ministers in former
Labour governments, through participation in a small, by-invitation workshop to
discuss the demise of the Audit Commission, organised by an independent policy
think tank. The purpose of the interviews and attending the workshop was to
gain insight into central government decision-making processes concerning the
abolition of the organisation. We were interested in gaining insights on how the
storylines related to the decision-making and implementation processes. We were
unable to interview civil servants; however, we did have access to email corre-
spondence between ministers and civil servants including brieﬁng notes, submis-
sions and reports, released under a third party Freedom of Information request.
In the next section, we provide a descriptive analysis of the development of
the Audit Commission from 1983 to 2010. This is followed by a theoretical
section explaining our approach to investigating the abolition process, and then
we present a detailed analysis before concluding with our key ﬁndings and
theoretical reﬂections.
The Audit Commission: 30 years of an expanding domain
The Audit Commission commenced its operations in 1983, having been estab-
lished by the then Conservative government. It acquired the local government
audit functions of the District Audit Service, originally established in the nine-
teenth century, in the context of a wider remit to ensure councils had arrange-
ments to secure economy, efﬁciency and effectiveness in their use of resources
(Campbell-Smith 2008). The functions and status of the Audit Commission
expanded considerably (Table 1), one signiﬁcant factor being the commitment
of the incoming 1997 Labour administration to public service improvement. It
was the view of that government (DETR 2001), The Local Government
Association (LGA – the peak body for the sector, and at that point Labour
controlled), and the Audit Commission that underperformance in local govern-
ment could be solved by the application of technocratic systems that would
expose problems, thus stimulating improvement to avoid ‘naming and shaming’.
Abolishing the Audit Commission 863
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This led to new and extensive systems for inspecting and reporting on local
government performance, in particular the Best Value regime and its successor
the comprehensive performance assessment (CPA) (Campbell-Smith 2008;
Stoker 2004; ODPM 2003). Similar systems were developed for other local
public services, thus extending the Audit Commission’s reach.
As the Audit Commission’s remit expanded, so concerns began to surface
about the value judgements underlying the inspection regimes and their cost in
terms of staff resources (Brown 1997; Cope and Goodship 2002; ETR 2000;
Financial Times 2002; Humphrey 2002; Kelly 2003; LGC 2006). The select
committees for Public Administration (PASC 2003) and Environment, Transport
Table 1. Chronology of Audit Commission remit
Date Event
Mid-1960 on Various reports propose agency concerned with economy, efﬁciency and
effectiveness (3Es) of local authorities, expanding the role of District
Audit Service.
1982 Local Government Finance Act 1982 establishes the Audit Commission,
responsible for securing audit and assessing 3Es in local authorities.
1983 Audit Commission commences.
1990 Acquires responsibility for securing external audit of the NHS.
1999 Powers extended to include inspection of best value authorities (local
authorities, national park authorities, police authorities, ﬁre authorities,
metropolitan county passenger transport authorities, and a variety of
other local public service bodies).
2003 Empowered to inspect registered social landlords (social housing providers)
and to undertake comprehensive performance assessment (CPA) of local
authorities.
2004 Functions extended to cover ﬁre and rescue authorities’ compliance with
the Fire and Rescue National Framework. Remit in Wales transferred to
the Auditor General for Wales.
2005 Acquires responsibility for appointment of auditors to English NHS
charities.
2007 Given statutory power to conduct data matching to combat fraud. Beneﬁt
Fraud Inspectorate transferred to the Audit Commission. New powers to
provide advice and assistance to other public bodies and to report on the
performance of English local authorities in the comprehensive area
assessment (CAA).
2008 Powers in relation to registered social landlords replaced by registered
providers of social housing, and new power to inspect these bodies at the
request of the Tenant Services Authority.
2010 Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) announces
work on CAA and certain other activities to cease, and its intention to
legislate for ‘local public audits’ and abolition of the Audit Commission.
Communities and Local Government Select Committee commences
inquiry.
2011 Communities and Local Government Select Committee report.
Government consultation on audit reforms.
2012 Draft Local Audit Bill published, containing provisions to abolish Audit
Commission. Appointment of new Audit Commission chair.
2013 Local Audit and Accountability Bill commences legislative process.
Source: Audit Commission; Campbell-Smith (2008).
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and the Regions (ETR 2004) recommended that the Audit Commission develop a
lighter-touch approach. Nevertheless, inspection was still central to the govern-
ment’s policy agenda and the Audit Commission and other regulators started
work on a successor to CPA, the comprehensive area assessment (CAA), in the
mid-2000s (Audit Commission 2009). The local government community, how-
ever, was more sceptical. The LGA was no longer Labour controlled and thus
lacked political alignment to the then government, and centralised systems of
inspection and regulation were being undermined by an emergent localist narra-
tive which was supported by the now majority of Conservative-controlled coun-
cils (Walker 2011). Even so, the Audit Commission continued to acquire
functions and powers, expanding its domain to include social housing providers
and NHS bodies, and developing a key role in the prevention and detection of
welfare beneﬁt fraud (Table 1).
Into reverse: the Audit Commission and the 2010 general election
The Audit Commission anticipated that the May 2010 general election would lead
to a change of government. They thought that they would have a continued, albeit
reduced, role given the three main English political parties’ desire to improve local
government efﬁciency in the aftermath of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis (interview 1).
The Commission had already introduced a programme of efﬁciency measures
(Audit Commission 2010), but was not oblivious to further retrenchment given
the Conservative Party pledge to end ‘the bureaucratic inspection regime that stops
councils focusing on residents’ main concerns’ (Conservative Party 2010, 76) and
the Liberal Democrats proposed to ‘scrap the nearly £1 billion of central govern-
ment inspection regimes on local councils’ (Liberal Democrats 2010, 90).
Nevertheless, the Audit Commission anticipated that Caroline Spelman MP, then
Shadow Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, was a likely
contender for this ministerial position should there be a Conservative government,
and noted that she had spoken in favour of the new CAA system (interview 1).
The Commission also attended the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat
party conferences in autumn 2009 to showcase the Oneplace website, a ﬂagship
component of the CAA, which it hoped would demonstrate the ability of this new
inspection regime to provide politicians and the general public with easy access to
performance data, thus being of value to whichever party formed the new govern-
ment (Audit Commission 2009). Ending inspection was considered possible, but
abolition was regarded as unlikely since it had not surfaced on party political
agendas (interviews 3 and 4).
Following the election, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition agree-
ment went further than the Audit Commission had expected, stating that the
government would ‘cut local government inspection and abolish the
Comprehensive Area Assessment’ (HM Government 2010a, 12). When
Cabinet portfolios were announced, it was Eric Pickles rather than Caroline
Spelman who was appointed Secretary of State for Communities and Local
Government. The Coalition announced an emergency budget on 22 June 2010
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which included a range of measures to reduce public expenditure. On 25 June
2010, Pickles formally instructed the Audit Commission to cease work on the
CAA and associated inspection work, and to cease its research activities. In the
light of these developments, the Audit Commission planned further workforce
downsizing and outsourcing of more of its audit work (interview 3).
Finally, on 13 August 2010 Pickles announced his intention to ‘disband’ the
Audit Commission and replace it with a localised audit system (DCLG 2010a),
stimulating a Select Committee inquiry (CLGC 2011).1 On 28 July 2011, DCLG
announced that the Audit Commission would outsource all of its in-house local
public audit work from 2012/13. The government consulted on its proposed audit
reforms and published its response in January 2012 (DCLG 2012). The draft
Local Audit Bill to enable abolition of the Audit Commission and the creation of
a local audit regime was published for pre-legislative scrutiny on 6 July 2012,
and the scrutiny committee reported on 17 January 2013 (Draft Local Audit Bill
ad hoc Committee 2013). The revised Local Audit and Accountability Bill
entered the House of Commons in May 2013 and received its Royal Assent on
30 January 2014.
Explaining reform through argumentative discourse analysis
There was very little criticism of the proposed abolition of the Audit
Commission, despite the body’s signiﬁcant and long-standing role in the
relationship between central and local government (and other local agencies)
and its origins in a previous Conservative government wishing to control local
public expenditure. This is somewhat surprising when viewed from the per-
spective of historical institutionalism, in which institutional ‘stickiness’ is
predicted on the basis that considerable political investment is needed to
overcome the accumulated sunk costs of the status quo (Pierson 2002). On
the other hand, neither did the Audit Commission take steps to challenge the
decision and seek its survival, as rational actor and resource dependency
theories would predict (Oliver 1991; Overman 2011; Dommett and Skelcher
2014).
It is also surprising given the challenges the government faced in achieving
other proposed abolitions of public bodies. The Public Bodies Bill proposed
abolishing 44 types of public body, with the option to extend this to a further
151, but its passage through Parliament was complex and lengthy despite all
party support for its overall intention. Proposals for speciﬁc abolitions were
opposed through high-proﬁle stakeholder campaigns (Dommett and Skelcher
2014).
We turn to ADA (Hajer 2005) to explore this paradox. ADA draws on a policy
analysis tradition that emphasises the importance of linguistic devices in framing
the construction of policy problems and solutions (Fischer 1993; Rein and Schön
1993). As Hajer observes, ‘language has the capacity to make politics, to create
signs and symbols that can shift power-balances and impact on institutions and
policy-making’ (2005, 300). By framing an issue in a particular way, language
866 K. Tonkiss & C. Skelcher
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serves the political functions of persuasion and justiﬁcation (Rein and Schön
1993) as well as coalescing a community of allegiants around this portrayal
(Stone 1989). As a result, analysis of discourse – ‘an ensemble of ideas, concepts
and categories through which meaning is given to. . . phenomena’ (Hajer 2005,
300) – is central to understanding how and why particular issues come to be
deﬁned as policy problems, the speciﬁc responses that are developed and the
extent to which they are accepted or rejected.
The statements through which discourses are articulated take the form of
narratives or stories, which can translate one construction of a policy issue into
accepted ‘common sense’. In UK public sector reform, these are often expressed
in a ‘from-to’ form, in which the proposed change delineates a past failing from
an anticipated future success (Newman 2001). Following Hajer, we see storylines
as the statements actors employ to summarise these complex narratives. Actors
who articulate similar storylines may develop ‘discursive afﬁnity’ (Hajer 2005,
304). Thus, we can talk of a discourse coalition, ‘the ensemble of story lines, the
actors that utter these story lines, and the practices through which these story
lines are expressed’ (ibid.). A discourse coalition may be said to be dominant
where other actors accept its position, and where it comes to inform the policy
process itself (Miller 2012). This dominance is achieved not simply by forming a
storyline, but rather through the deployment of discursive resources which
comprise the different linguistic tools and media through which their under-
standing of the world can be presented.
The abolition agenda: discourses, storylines, practices and coalitions
We now apply the ADA approach to the politics of the Audit Commission
abolition proposal. We map the pro- and anti-abolition discourse coalitions
(Table 2) and then use these data to explain the lack of resistance to the proposal
and how it came to be widely accepted in a relatively short space of time.
Pro-abolition discourse coalition
Pickles, the incoming Secretary of State responsible for the Audit Commission,
held robust views on the need for there to be greater opportunities for citizens to
challenge local councils’ spending and performance. On taking ofﬁce, and
unknown to the Audit Commission, he instructed a small group of civil servants
to establish how the Commission could be abolished and how this proposal could
best be presented (DCLG 2010b, 2010c). From this developed one of the most
prominent storylines within the pro-abolition discourse coalition – the Audit
Commission’s lack of local accountability when compared with the prospects
offered by citizens becoming ‘armchair auditors’ of local authorities in an
environment of extensive online data transparency (interview 2). Thus, the
ofﬁcial announcement of the proposed abolition stated that ‘Ministers believe
that the work of the Commission has become increasingly less focused on
accountability to citizens but on reporting upwards to government’, with
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Table 2. Pro- and anti-abolition discourse coalitions
Discourse
coalition Discourse Storylines Actors Practices
Pro-abolition The Audit Commission has
become bureaucratic,
inefﬁcient and
burdensome for local
councils; it is not
delivering a regulatory
function that is in the
public interest; reform
will rectify these
problems and will
deliver accountability to
the people, not to
government
Accountability Government
Conservative
MPs
Right-wing
press
Parliamentary
debates
Evidence to
select
committee
Press brieﬁngs
Localism and
reducing
burdensome
and
bureaucratic
demands
Government
Private sector
auditing ﬁrms
Local
authorities
Peak sector
groups
Right-wing
think tanks
Ministerial
statements
Evidence to
select
committee
Lobbying
ministers
Waste and
inefﬁciency
Government
Conservative
MPs
Right-wing
press
Parliamentary
debates
Parliamentary
questions
Press brieﬁngs
Self-interested
lobbying
Government
Conservative
MPs
Right-wing
press
Parliamentary
debates
Parliamentary
questions
Press brieﬁngs
Open market
competition
Government
Private sector
auditing ﬁrms
Evidence to
select
committee
Lobbying
Anti-abolition
but pro-
reform
The Audit Commission
provides a high-quality
independent audit
function, and it is not
wasteful/biased as has
been claimed in some
reports; if regulation is
to be reformed, the new
arrangements must
preserve the
independence of local
public audit while
ﬁnding ways to deliver
the lower audit fees
Government requires
Beneﬁcial and
high-quality
activities
Left-leaning
press Audit
Commission
Third-sector
organisations
Evidence to
select
committee
Responses to
Parliamentary
questions
Independent
voice
Audit
Commission
Third-sector
organisations
Trade union
Labour party
Evidence to
select
committee
Response to
consultation
Responses to
Parliamentary
questions
More efﬁcient
than
fragmenting
audit
procurement
Audit
Commission
Trade union
Evidence to
select
committee
Response to
consultation
Open letter to
minister
Source: Authors’ analysis of research data.
868 K. Tonkiss & C. Skelcher
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 06
:05
 20
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
Pickles quoted as saying that ‘rather than being a watchdog that champions
taxpayers’ interests, it has become a creature of the Whitehall State’ (DCLG
2010a). Pickles was supported by grass-root Conservative criticisms of the Audit
Commission’s inspection regime and growing disillusionment with CPA/CAA,
especially by Conservative-controlled councils (interview 2).
A related storyline was ‘promoting localism’, removing ‘[e]laborate
mechanisms of audit, inspection, targets and guidance [that] enable the centre
to micromanage the public sphere to an unprecedented degree’ (HM
Government 2010b, 4). The localism storyline was also prevalent in evidence
to the Select Committee inquiry into the government’s local audit reforms.
Private sector auditing ﬁrms such as Deloitte LLP and BDO LLP argued that
the audit regime should be responsive and accountable to ‘local taxpayers’
(CLGC 2011, ev.194–205). Cornwall County Council’s submission was char-
acteristic of those local authorities that gave evidence: ‘We believe that
individual authorities are best placed to understand the challenges facing
their communities’ (ev.w8) and the LGA agreed that the plan to abolish the
Audit Commission was ‘a practical expression of the localism and devolution
agenda’ (ev.137–140), revealing again the critical role of predominantly
Conservative-controlled local authorities in this discourse coalition. This was
a widely supported storyline which also brought the County Councils
Network, a peak sector group, and the Taxpayers’ Alliance, an inﬂuential
right-wing lobby group, into the discourse coalition.
A storyline about waste, inefﬁciency and self-interested lobbying at the Audit
Commission was also prominent. Our analysis of 109 of the 163 parliamentary
questions (PQs) about the Audit Commission tabled between December 2009
and June 2011 concerned claims of inefﬁciency and frivolous expenditure, most
by Conservative MPs, including political allies of Pickles. These asked about the
cost of the Oneplace website (Grant Schapps MP, 20 January 2010), the number
and cost of marketing and press staff employed by the Audit Commission
(Andrew Grifﬁths MP, 14 September 2010), at which London restaurants it
had paid for meals (Andrew Bridgen MP, 3 May 2011), and claims that the
Audit Commission was engaging in lobbying in favour of its own interests
(Christopher Chope MP, 23 March 2010). Media reports also claimed that the
Audit Commission had been involved in lobbying Conservative MPs to prevent
its abolition (e.g. Doughty 2010).
Some sections of the press, especially the populist right-wing-oriented Daily
Mail, gave regular, front-page coverage to claims that spending at the Audit
Commission was out of control, linked to the Mail’s more general campaigns
against quangos on which it ran 150 articles between 2009 and 2013. Other
newspapers ran similar stories, claiming days out at horse races, expensive
dinners and dubious purchases of ﬂowers, all funded by the Audit
Commission (e.g. Telegraph 2011). Many of these stories were linked to
particular PQs, and the Audit Commission replies claimed they misrepresented
or exaggerated the position. Nevertheless, they gave popular credence to
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Pickles’ claim that the abolition would ‘save the taxpayer £50 million per
year’ (DCLG 2010a).
The ﬁnal pro-abolition storyline concerns the merits of open competition for
audit services. This was particularly emphasised by private sector auditing ﬁrms
who stood to gain from the contracting out of the Commission’s own audit work.
For example, BDO LLP commented that ‘the disposal of the Audit
Commission’s audit practice to a diverse range of large, medium and small
sized ﬁrms in the private and third sectors presents the most effective way to
create lasting competition and reduce the cost of providing audit and assurance
services to public bodies’ (CLGC 2011, ev.199). Government also emphasised
the beneﬁts of a fully competitive market, thus connecting the beneﬁts of
efﬁciency gains to the wider austerity discourse.
Anti-abolition discourse coalition
Only a small number of actors argued against the abolition decision, and most of
those were connected in some way to the Audit Commission. One storyline
employed was that the Audit Commission’s provided beneﬁcial and high-quality
functions. This is implicit in the Audit Commission evidence:
Over the years we have helped local authorities, health bodies, the police
and ﬁre services, and social landlords manage their money better, improve
their performance, and work with other agencies – to the beneﬁt of local
users and local tax-payers. (CLGC 2011, ev.161)
Some parts of the more pro-Audit Commission press also supported this; for
example, the Guardian (2010) and LGC (2011) highlighted the Commission’s
key role in tackling poor quality local services and driving improvement.
The Audit Commission sought to utilise the austerity storyline to its advan-
tage, noting that ‘it is counter-intuitive to disband expertise on [value for
money], data, analysis, governance and assessment when severe ﬁnancial
pressures are increasing the risk of ﬁnancial or service failure in local public
services’ (CLGC 2011, ev.166). Some charitable organisations reﬂected similar
concerns. For example, the Women’s Resource Centre commented speciﬁcally
on the abolition which, it argued, would negatively impact on gender equality
at a local level (ev.179–181).
A second storyline portrayed the Audit Commission as an independent, publicly
minded organisation fulﬁlling an important public function. The Audit Commission
itself framed the proposals as a challenge to the principle of independent audit.
Michael O’Higgins (then Chair of the Audit Commission) stated that ‘[i]ndepen-
dent appointment is one of the main safeguards of auditors’ independence. It should
not be set aside lightly’ (Audit Commission 2010). The Commission stated that
the proposals risked ‘undermining the established safeguards over the stew-
ardship and use of public money, which are essential for maintaining public
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conﬁdence’ (2011a, 3). This storyline was developed by others, for example,
Prospect, the trade union representing Audit Commission staff, noted that
It is commonly held that the most effective way of ensuring the indepen-
dence of auditors is for them to be appointed wholly independently of the
audited body. The current system [achieves this]. (CLGC 2011, ev.176)
Eugene Sullivan, then Chief Executive of the Audit Commission, is reported as
saying:
. . .we should acknowledge that this is a pivotal point in the history of
public service. We will be losing a distinctive, and publicly owned, local
public audit service and its District Auditors who have helped to protect
the public purse effectively for over 150 years. (Johnstone 2012)
This statement reinforces the independence of the Audit Commission and frames
its audit functions as an essential aspect of good public governance, as did the
Labour Party, which claimed that the closure of the Audit Commission would
‘lead to a cosy, incestuous relationship between councils and the ﬁrms inspecting
their books’ (LGC 2010). Similar sentiments were echoed by Clive Betts MP,
Chair of the Select Committee undertaking the inquiry into the abolition, who
asked ‘If a council appoints an auditor, the auditor reports the public interest and
the councils says “we don’t like that, we’re getting rid of you”. Who is supposed
to oversee this? It is a fundamental issue’ (Kaffash 2011).
The Audit Commission also developed a third storyline countering the pro-
abolition view that open competition for audit would bring efﬁciencies. In his
response on the DCLG consultation, O’Higgins detailed potential extra costs that
could stem from the changes to the audit function brought about by abolition
(Audit Commission 2011b) – something which was also highlighted by Prospect
in their Select Committee evidence. This was based on the multiplicity of
different bodies (private audit ﬁrms, local audit committees and the National
Audit Ofﬁce) required to discharge the Audit Commission’s audit functions
should it be abolished. The Audit Commission board also tried to dispel
‘myths’ about its spending and inefﬁciency by conveying its efﬁciency storyline
as ‘fact’. For example, shortly after the announcement of the abolition,
O’Higgins wrote an open letter to the Secretary of State in which he highlighted
that the Audit Commission had not been reluctant to disclose its spending, as
some reports had claimed, that it had not wasted money and that it had not been
attempting to lobby on behalf of speciﬁc causes (Audit Commission 2010).
Explaining the dominance of the pro-abolition discourse coalition
Discourse coalitions affect the distribution of power when they are able to
achieve discursive structuration – dominating the way an issue is conceptualised
– and discursive institutionalisation – solidifying this understanding into
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practices or institutional arrangements (Hajer 2005). Both effects are evident.
The number and mutually supportive nature of the pro-abolition storylines
played a major role in achieving discourse structuration (Table 2), as did their
afﬁnity with the wider and broadly accepted discourse of the need for public
sector austerity. The pro-abolition coalition was able to achieve multiple reinfor-
cing articulations of the storylines due to its large membership (Table 3), which
then provided a solid basis for the newly elected government – aided by material
resources including a popular mandate, legislative capacity and executive author-
ity – to move forward with the abolition. The inﬂuential actors it contained were
able to access various institutional settings that ensured their utterances would be
reported in the media, and connections between particular Conservative MPs and
right-wing newspapers had the effect of amplifying these storylines. Although
the various parties in the discourse coalition did not necessarily accept all the
storylines, there was enough to bind them together.
Our analysis shows that timing and time are important factors in discursive
structuration. Pickles’ abolition proposal was developed in secret, and he only
notiﬁed the Audit Commission’s chair a few hours ahead of his Commons
statement (interview 3; DCLG 2010b, 2010c). Such timing prevented the
Commission from formulating and seeking to build a discourse coalition around
its own anti-abolition storyline. The strength of the pro-abolition coalition,
informed by well-developed and strong storylines, may have meant that such
an anti-abolition coalition would still not have saved the body. However, timing
is important in understanding why there was so little of the contestation over
abolition that, as we have noted, is typically found in such cases. Time was also
important. Cumulative discursive structuration is apparent when the evidence to
the November 2010 Select Committee inquiry (Table 3) is compared to that for
the government consultation some 12 months later (DCLG 2012). In the latter
case, none of the submissions suggested retention of the Audit Commission but
all commented on the proposed new local audit regime. Actors had already
accepted that abolition was inevitable and had turned their attention to the future.
Clive Betts MP reﬂected this position on the completion of the Select Committee
inquiry, when he noted that the demise of the Commission had gone by ‘largely
unlamented’ and focused his attention instead on ensuring that the regime
replacing the Commission would be robust and preserve the principle of inde-
pendent audit (Betts 2011).
From this, it is a short step to discursive institutionalisation. This is
illustrated by the practices for the appointment of a new Audit Commission
chair. Despite the legislation to abolish the Audit Commission not yet having
been considered by Parliament, the government’s advertisement sought an
individual with experience and skills to ‘help oversee a process of signiﬁcant
downsizing leading up to its closure’ (CLGC 2012, 7). At the pre-appointment
hearing by a committee of MPs, the preferred candidate was asked whether he
thought the decision to abolish was right. He responded: ‘I applied for the job
given that the decision was taken, and my responsibility is to make sure that
that is what happens’ (op cit., oral evidence 4). Questions then focused on his
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Table 3. Submissions to Select Committee inquiry
Contributor For abolition Against abolition N/A
Associations
National Association of Local Councils X
Chief Fire Ofﬁcers Association X
Local Government Association X
District Councils Network X
County Councils Network X
New Local Government Network X
Taxpayers’ Alliance X
APSE X
COPROP, FPS, NaPPMI and NBVBS X
Centre for Public Scrutiny X
Local authorities
Kent County Council X
Cornwall County Council X
Essex County Council X
Staffordshire County Council X
Warwickshire County Council X
Gateshead Council X
Westminster City Council X
Barnsley Council X
Oxfordshire County Council X
Audit organisations
Audit Commission X
Audit Practice of the Audit Commission X
Vanguard Consulting X
Deloitte LLP X
BDO LLP X
MacIntyre Hudson X
HJC Actuarial Consulting X
Mazars LLP X
Grant Thornton LLP UK X
Audit Scotland X
Mid Kent Internal Audit X
Financial bodies
CIPFA X
Financial Reporting Council X
ACCA X
ICAEW X
Third-sector bodies
Age UK X
Women’s Resource Centre X
Shelter X
Children’s Society X
Other organisations
DCLG X
Housing Information Ltd X
Public Concern at Work X
Tenant Inspection Services X
Community Resilience UK X
Prospect X
CIFAS X
IPSOS Mori X
Note: The N/A column refers to those submissions which did not speciﬁcally refer to the abolition of
the Audit Commission and so could not be included in the analysis.
Source: Authors’ analysis of evidence, communities and Local Government Committee (2011).
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aptitude for scaling down and closing the Commission, and his appointment
was conﬁrmed.
Discursive structuration and institutionalisation show us how the pro-abolition
coalition was able to dominate the discursive ﬁeld, but not why the Audit
Commission refrained from mounting a defence. Here we turn to Bourdieu’s
(1977) concept of habitus – ‘a practical sense of the “the game”, a set of
dispositions to act’ (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 101), or what Miller
(2012, 72) refers to as ‘an almost unthinking form of social action’. Habitus,
then, is constituted by the deep background norms and practices associated with
particular positions. Thus, the Commission’s response was to frame the proposals
as a challenge to the principle of independent audit rather than to seek to preserve
the organisation:
Our strategy from the beginning was. . . Firstly, to respect the right of the
Secretary of State to change the architecture of government. . . We
shouldn’t complain about being abolished. That’s the privilege of minis-
ters. Secondly, to defend the Commission and its staff from abuse and
gratuitous inaccuracy of which there was a lot. . . [We] didn’t oppose the
decision in principle, but did argue quite strongly against much of the
unnecessary abuse. (Interview 3)
The habitus of the Audit Commission was one of public self-denial in respect of
the future of the organisation. The Commission’s board could have mounted a
defence and opposed abolition, but instead almost automatically chose to
acquiesce due to the deep norms that come with accepting appointed public
ofﬁce (Dommett and Skelcher 2014). Consequently, the discursive resources
open to the Audit Commission were constrained, and without substantial stake-
holder opposition to the proposals the abolition was relatively straightforward.
Conclusion
Our analysis of the abolition of the Audit Commission shows the importance of
understanding the way in which the politics of administrative reform is a matter
of discursive framing; the expansion of the Commission’s role in the 2000s was
framed in terms of the public service improvement imperative, while its demise
was constructed in terms of the body being out of control. The determining
factors in the latter case were the ability of the pro-abolition discourse coalition
to achieve discursive structuration and institutionalisation – abolition became a
social fact even before Parliament had considered the complex legislation
involved, and this was reﬂected in the new chair’s appointment process.
Instead, debate focused on the technical and ethical issues involved in reverting
to the nineteenth-century practice of councils appointing their own auditors. This
helps to explain why, contrary to the literature and parallel agency termination
cases, the Audit Commission’s abolition was relatively simple and unopposed.
The ability of one discourse coalition to structure the high politics of reform to
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their advantage thus set the context for the low politics of technical debate about
the new audit system, which suggests that questions of technical feasibility are
unlikely to derail a reform initiative once its promoters gain discursive
ascendency.
This analysis contributes to the literature on administrative reform because it
demonstrates that major reforms are not just a matter of the material resources
available to a newly elected government. Material resources should not be
ignored – Pickles had the authority and political support to propose the abolition.
However, they interact with the discursive realm and thus, in the case of the
Audit Commission, the storylines of the various political, media, business and
local government actors developed a discursive afﬁnity and melded into a
powerful pro-abolition discourse coalition. Framing the Audit Commission as
wasteful and unaccountable enhanced the material resources available to govern-
ment. Isolated and bound by institutional norms not to criticise its own abolition,
the Audit Commission and its few supporters were placed in a weak position. By
highlighting the interaction between material and discursive levels, the paper has
demonstrated the merits of using the ADA approach to analyse administrative
reform and therefore to help explain why the assumptions of institutional sticki-
ness commonly found in the literature are sometimes not observed. Further
research into the implementation of other reforms in other policy areas – such
recent reforms to the NHS and to the social security system in the UK – as well
as in different circumstances with greater contestation over the reform or within
the broader policy arena – could help to shed more light on the role of discourse
coalitions in the implementation of such policy decisions.
This paper has also added valuable insights to the ADA literature, with
particular reference to interactions between the discursive and the material.
Interpretive approaches such as are often critiqued on the basis that they fail
to link the ideational and institutional contexts in which discourses are
articulated (Gains 2011; Hay 2011), and that they lack a solid link between
discourse and action (Wagenaar 2012). Yet in this study, we have shown how
the institutional context both constructs the norms of behaviour which facil-
itate contexts for the application of actors’ utterances and provides the
material resources through which a reform proposal is realised. Discursive
resources have been shown to be connected to material resources, with the
parliamentary system giving a government minister considerable legislative
capacity, and important material resources to underpin the discursive
resources at their disposal.
Further, we have also demonstrated that the ability of a discourse coalition to
gain advantage is affected by timing and sequencing in the deployment of
discursive resources, placing opponents at a disadvantage since they have to
respond to the initial framing. The case of other bodies proposing abolition under
the Public Bodies Act shows that the ability to launch a more effective defence
could have given rise to greater contestation over the decision, although this may
have proved ultimately unsuccessful given the strength of the pro-abolition
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coalition which had built up over a long period of time and coalesced around
numerous high-proﬁle storylines.
Our study also contributes to policy and practice. Policy advice of adminis-
trative reform recognises the importance of winning ‘hearts and minds’, but our
work shows that winning control of the way actors talk about an issue is at least as
important. Talk frames an issue, locating it in relation to other issues, engendering
it with normative ﬂavour and pointing towards a solution. As Schmidt argues:
‘speaking of change. . . rather than just thinking it, is key to explaining the actions
that lead to major policy transformations’ (2011, 107). Discussion of discourses
may seem abstract and obtuse, but as any effective politician and manager knows it
is the ability to affect the way people talk about an issue that is the key to change.
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Note
1. See Timmins and Gash (2014) for a detailed account of the events surrounding the
abolition of the Audit Commission between May 2010 and December 2013.
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